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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
Vl~NUS TRIPP, 
Plaintiff andAppella11t, 
-vs.-
GRANITE HOLDING COMPANY 
and DOUGLAS OPTICAL 
COMPANY 
Defendants and Resp011dents. 
Case 
No.11304 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
GRANITE HOLDING COMPANY 
S1'A 'l'El\IENT OF CASE 
This case involves an action by plaintiff against de-
fendants for personal injuries suffered by plaintiff when 
she fell on a city sidewalk abutting property owned by 
Granite Holding Company but leased by defendant Doug-
las Optical Company for the operation of the business of 
testing its customers' eyes and selling eyeglasses. Plain-
tiff had been on the premises leased by Douglas Optical 
and aftf'r transacting her business left the premises in 
company of another person and fell on a defect on the 
eity sidewalk. 
The q n0stion presented herein for determination as 
far as Granite Holding Company is concerned is whether 
1 
or not the owner of real property abutting a public si<le-
walk has a <luty to his lea see 's business invitees to keep 
and maintain the public sidewalk, which may or may not 
be in the inevitable course of ingress and egress to the 
entrance of the leased premises, free from defects and 
disrepair not caused or contributed to by the property 
ow11er. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The Third Judicial District Court ( J u<lge Stewart 
M. Hanson) grante<l defendants' :Motion for Summary 
Judgment on the ground that neither defendant had a 
duty to Douglas Optical 's business invitee for the repair 
and maintenance of the public sidewalk abutting the 
property owned by Granite Holding Company but leased 
Douglas Optical Company. 
RELIEF SOUGHT 
Defendant, Granite Holding Company, seeks to have 
the action of the lower court affirmed in granting this 
defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment against 
plaintiff. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
For the sake of clarity and convenience in this brief 
the parties will be referred to according to their respec-
tive designations in the lower court. 
Def end ant, Granite Holding Company, is the owner 
of real property consisting of a building and ground at 
2 
1096 East 21st Sonth in au area known as Sugar House 
in Salt Lake City and which property is located on the 
Southwest corner of 218t South Street and 11th East 
Strert. At all times pertirn,nt to this artion Douglas Op-
tical Company leased a portion of premises described 
from Granite Holding Company for the purpose of op-
erating an optical shop and where its customers' eyes 
were examined and where eyeglasses were sold (R. 16). 
Inasmuch as the property owned by Granite Holding 
Company is situated on the southwest corner there ar£' 
sidewalks on city owned property abutting defendants' 
property immediately on the north and east sides 
thereof. 
Prior to J\farch 31, 1967, the sidewalk abutting this 
defendants' property to the north fell into a state of cfo;-
repair hy reason of weathering and the passage of time. 
Neither Granite Holding Company nor Douglas Opti-
cal C0mpany through any action on their part caused or 
contributed to the condition of the sidewalk (R. 17). 
l\rr. William L. Hansen, president of Granite Hold-
ing Company, rontacted the proper officials of Salt Lake 
City and requested permission to repair the sidewalk by 
completely coyering the sidewalk abutting its property 
with a roating of asphalt. Salt Lake City refused per-
mis8ion to repair the sidewalk except according to its 
own srwrifirations which called for the tearing up of the 
old sidewalk arnl the installation of a complete new con-
crete or rement sidewalk and unless completely new side-
walks were installed Salt Lake City refused to permit 
3 
Granite Holding Company to do any repair work (H. 17). 
Ac~ordingly, the city sidewalk was not repaired by Gran-
ite Holding Company. 
On March 31, 1967, at approximately 1 :30 P.~l. plain-
tiff, who had apparently been to Douglas Optical Com-
pany and had purC'hased a pair of eyeglasses, after leav-
ing the premises referred to and while in company of a 
person who was supporting and assisting her, fell on the 
city sidewalk thereby allegedly sustaining the injuries 
complained of. The place on the sidewalk where plaintiff 
fell was not ou property owned by either defendant but 
on property owned by Salt Lake City (R. 2, 17-18). 
ARGUMENT 
POIN'l' I 
THE OWNER OF REAL PROPERTY ABUT-
TED BY A PUBLIC SIDEWALK HAS NO 
DUTY TO :MAINTAIN SAID SIDEWALK 
NOR REPAIR DEU'ECTS NOT CAUSED 
NOR CONTRIBUTED TO BY HIS OWN 
CONDUCT. 
It seems to be well established that the primary re-
sponsibility for the maintenance and repair of sidewalks 
is that of the city and not that of the abutting property 
owner. Safeway Stores v. Billings, 335 Pac. 2d 636 
(Okla.). A municipal corporation cannot, by its own act, 
devolve its duty of keeping sidewalks and streets onto 
abutting property owners so as to relieve itself from lia-
bility for injuries resulting to an individual by reason of 
4 
its failure to perform such duty. King v. J. E. Crosby, 
l 11c., l!H Okla. 525, 131 Pac. 2d 10:-.i. 
Utah, like most otlwr jurisdictions, has ruled on tlw 
du1 ies of rities and lanclow1wrs of proprrty abutting pub-
lic sidewalks and streets to pedestrians and other users of 
puhlic ways and thoroughfares. 
In Spencer v. Salt Lake City, 17 Utah 2d 362, 412 
l'ae. 2d 449 (1966) plaintiff sued Salt Lake City alleging 
that she suffered injuries when Rhe tripped and fell on a 
dPfrctive sidewalk where tree roots had raised it about 
fonr to six inches in front of 463 Douglas Street. At the 
prr-trial the District Court granted the city's l\lotion to 
DiRmisR plaintiff's complaint on the ground that (1) 
the rluim was not filed by plaintiff within 30 days, and 
(2) the claim was insufficient in that it did not state the 
amount of damages claimed. 
In vacating the lower court's Order of Dismissal and 
n·mancling the ease for trial, the Supn·nw Conrt stated 
at page 363 of the Utah Reports: 
Our statutes imposr upon the city tlw duty of 
maintenance of streets and Ri<lcwalks, and it is es-
tablished that the city is lial1le for ncgligrnce in 
performing this dnty; See Nyman v. Cedar City, 
12 Utah 2cl 45, 361 P. 2cl 1114 .... 
Salt Lake Cit.11 v. 8/wbach ct al., 108 Utah 266, 159 
I'. 2d 149 ( 1945) involved an action against defendants 
1o (letermine thl' liability of a property owner and of a 
t(•1tant of the property for damag-rs suffered by the city 
dne to i11jurieR sustained hy a pedestrian through a de-
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feet in a trap door in the sidewalk installed and main-
tained for the benefit of the property. 
The case confirmed the duty of the city to maintain 
public sidewalks within its limits in a safe condition for 
use in the usual mode by pedestrians thereon. Howenr, 
the Shubach case differs from the instant case because 
in the former case a vault or chute had been placed under 
the public sidewalk for the use and convenience of the 
abutting landowner while in the latter the condition of 
the public sidewalk was not caused or contributed to by 
the acts of defendants. 
Basinger v. Standard Furn,iture Company ct al., 118 
Utah 107, 220 Pac. 2d 117 (1950) is a case more nearly 
akin factually to the case on appeal hereon. That was 
an action hy plaintiff against defendant to recover for 
injuries sustained by her on stumbling over the ridge on 
a driveway which was used hy defendant to unload mer-
chandise from its warehouse to its retail store but which 
driveway went across and was part of a public sidewalk. 
The trial court granted a non-suit to all defendants and 
plaintiff appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed the 
lower court holding that the evidence failed to show that 
defendants caused the ridge to occur or that they had 
any obligation to correct it. 
As part of its consideration of the matter the court 
quoted from the Schubach case, supra, at 159 P. 2d 149, 
143 stating 
The ultimate liability is upon the author or con-
tinuer of the nuisance ... 
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And nt 159 P. 2<l 149, 164 the court said: 
There exists no obligation on the part of an abut-
ter to keep the sidewalk adjoining his premises in 
repair, nor is he liabl<' for any state of disrepair. 
His obligation can only arise where he creates 
through use or otherwise some unsafe or danger-
ous condition. See Daley v. Matthews, Ml Cal. 
A pp. 2d 545, 122 P. 2cl 81. 
The evidence fails to show that the respondents 
caused the ridge to occur, or that they had any 
obligation to correct it. Their use of the drive-
way was within their general right of use thereof. 
The respondents were not making any extraordi-
nary use of the sidewalk, nor doing anything 
which was in derogation of the rights of the pub-
lic. Certain cracks appear across the driveway -
from cast to west - hut they, be their cause from 
use or 'veathering, are not probative of any neg-
ligent use by defendants. It follows, that the 
trial court was corr0ct in his ruling granting a 
judgment of non suit as against the plaintiff. 
Somo cases from other jurisdictions with the same or 
similar holdings arc as follows: 
Ellsworth v. Colorado Bcrerage Conipcvny, 150 Colo. 
19, 370 P. 2d 159, in the absence of statute, the owner or 
oc:cupm1t of adjoining property is under no obligation to 
repair the street in front of his premises and is not liable 
for an injury arising from a defect thereon not resulting 
from his affirmatiYe act. 
Major, .. Fraser, 78 Nev. 14, 368 P. 2cl 369, an abut-
ting property owner or occupant who did not create a 
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defect in the sidewalk could not he held liable to a pedes-
trian on the theory of nuisance, or on the theory of breach 
of duty to repair for injuries sustained by the pedestria 11 
when she fell after her heel caught in a crack in the 
sidewalk. 
Jones v. Western Auto Supply, :rrn P. 2d 562 (Okla. 
1962), defendants who owned or occupied a building abut-
ting a public side,valk had no duty to keep the sidewalk 
in repair aud were not liable for injuries sustained by 
pedestrian who stepped into a hole in the sidewalk where 
the defect was not created by defendants. 
Since plaintiff does uot disagree as to the law as it de-
fines the duty of the owner or occupier of property abut-
ting public sidewalks as that duty relates to pedestrians, 
defendant, Granite Holding Company sees no reason to 
argue extensively on this subject. Suffice to say that the 
law as it is now well established imposes no duty on 
either defendant to repair the defect on the public side-
walk at the place plaintiff fell and allegedly injured her-
self. This is so under the well established general rule of 
law and the facts of this case inasmuch as the defects on 
the sidewalk were not created or caused hy the defendant. 
POINT II 
THE DUTY OF REPAIRING DEFECTS IN A 
PUBLIC SIDEvVALK IN THE INEVITABLE 
AVENUE OF INGRESS AN"D J;~GRF~SS INTO 
DEFENDANTS ABU TT ING PROPERTY, 
·wHICH DEFECTS 'VERE NOT CAUSED OR 
CREATED BY DEFJiJNDANTS, SHOULD NO'l' 
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BE IMPOSED UPON DJ;~l1'ENDANTS IN THIS 
CASJ;J BECAUSE: 
A. PLAINTIFF HAS AN ADEQUATE 
REMEDY AT LAW AND THEREFORE 
NO NEED DIC'rATES THE EXTENSION 
OF SUCH DUTIES. 
B. THE TERMS "INEVITABLE AVE-
NUE OF INGRESS AND EGRESS" ARE 
SO AMBIGUOUS THAT NO RULE CAN 
BE FORMULATED THAT WOULD REA-
SONABLY SERVE AS GUIDELINES FOR 
THE DUTIES IMPOSED ON THE ABUT-
'rING LANDO-WNER IN THIS AND SIMI-
LAR CASES. 
C. ABSENT A DUTY TO DO SO, DEFEND-
ANT LANDOWNER A'rTEMPTED TO 
GET AUTHORITY TO REPAIR THE DE-
FECTS IN THE SIDEWALK IN ORDER 
TO MAKE IT SAFE BUT WAS REFUSED 
SUCH AUTHORITY BY THE CITY. 
The elements which defendant, Granite Holding 
Company, urges, militates against extending the duties 
of an abutting laud owner for the repair of defects on a 
public sidewalk not created by him, and as outlined will 
be discussed under Point II on the order presented above. 
A. PLAINTIFF HAS AN ADEQUATE 
REMEDY AT LA'V AND THEREFORE 
NO NEED DICTATES THE EXTENSION 
OF SUCH DUTIES. 
'rhe following code proYisions are pertinent to the 
matter being discussed: 
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Section 63-30-8, U. C. A., 1953, as amended: Im-
munity from suit of all governmental entities is 
waived for any injury caused hy a defeetive, un-
safe, or dangerous condition of any highway, 
road, str0et, alley, crosswalk, sidewalk, culvert, 
tunnel, bridge, Yiaclurt or other structure located 
thereon. 
Section 63-30-11, U. C. A. 1933, as amended: Anv 
person having a claim for injury to person o~ 
property against a governmental entity or its 
employees may petition said entity for appropri-
ate relief including the award of money damages. 
Section 68-30-13, U. C. A., 1953, as amended: ... 
any claim filed against a eity or incorporated town 
under Section 63-30-8 shall be governed by the 
provisions of Section 10-7-77, Utah Code Anno-
tated, 1953. 
The applicable rirovisions of Section 10-7-77, 
U. C. A., 1953 are: 
Every claim against a city ... for ... injuries .. . 
caused by the defective, unsafe, dangerous .. . 
condition of any ... sidewalk ... of such city .. . 
shall within thirty days after the happening of 
such injury ... he presented to the ... city coun-
cil of such city . . . in writing, signed by the 
claimant .... 
As indicated by the Utah Supreme Court in the case 
of Spencer v. Salt Lake City, supra, the state statutes 
impose upon the city the duty of maintenance of streets 
and sidewalks, and it is well established that the city is 
liable for negligence in performing that duty. Section 
10-7-77, U.C.A., 1953, provides the means by which the 
claimaut initiates and presents this claim for injnries to 
the city. In ~mpport of this, defendant cites and hy refer-
ence adopts the cases discussed ancl eitecl in Point I. 
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Inasmuch as plaintiff has an adequate remedy at law 
against the tortf easor in this action, necessity does not 
require that the law as it now is in relation to pedestrian 
and abutting property owners to city sidewalks be ex-
tended to give plaintiff a remedy not heretofore thought 
necessary by the accumulated legal and judicial wisdom 
up to this point in history. Rather than extend the duties 
of abutting landowners so that his duties as to pedestrian 
users of city sidewalks become harsh, burdensome, equi-
table, and impractical, let plaintiff look to the remedy 
provided for her by the state legislature for the injuries 
allegedly sustained by her. 
B. THE TERMS "INEVITABLE AVENUE 
OF INGRESS AND EGRESS'' ARE SO Al\I-
BIGUOUS THAT NO RULE CAN BE FORMU-
LATED THAT WOULD REASONABLY 
SERVE AS GUIDELINES F'OR THE DUTIES 
IMPOSED ON THE ABUTTING LANDOWN-
ER IN 'l'HIS AND SIMILAR CASES. 
Plaintiff seeks to have this court extend the doctrine 
of business invitor-invitee to non-owned premises of 
the property owner where such non-owned premises in-
volve the inevitable annue of ingress and egress to the 
owner's premises. Defendant, Granite Holding Com-
pany, of course, was not engaged in business at 1096 East 
21st South so it did not invite plaintiff to its premises 
for business or any other purpose. Plaintiff was how-
ever, a business invitee of defendant, Douglas Optical 
Company, at the premises owned by Granite Holding 
Company. 
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This defendant contends that no relationship of 
business invitor-invitee existed between it and plaintiff. 
However, even if such a relationship could be construed 
to have existed, it would be meaningless to extend that 
relationship to premises not owned h~, this defenedant. 
The word "inevitable" means according to Black's 
Law Dictionary, 4th Ed., p. 916: 
Incapable of being avoided; fortuitous; transend-
ing the power of human care, foresight, or exer-
tion to avoid or prevent, and therefore suspend-
ing legal relations so far as to excuse from the 
performance of contract obligations, or from lia-
bility for consequent loss. 
Dc•fendant contends that the terms "ineYitable ave-
nue of ingress or egress'' to its premises is so ambiguous 
that no rule can reasonably be set down to guide the 
prnperty owner as to where his duty extends to his busi-
ness invitee while on another's premises. 
Suppose plaintiff li \'Cd ten miles from defendant's 
JH'<'mises. She decided to lean her home and go to de-
fendant's store. After leaving her home she walked on 
the sidewalk 011 her premises and after getting on city 
property immediately out:side her property :she fell be-
cause of a <lefect on the city sidewalk. Suppose further 
that there was no other way she could leave her property. 
"\\' ould the city sidewalk in front of her home, ten miles 
from defendant's store, be an inevitahk• avenue of in-
gress to defendant's property~ CNtai11 ly she could not 
amid passing over that portion of the sitlewalk to get 
to her destination so in that sensP it would lw au ine\'i-
12 
table avenue of ingress. 8urely it would be ridiculous 
to extend defendant's duty to plan tiff as that duty relates 
to repairing defective sidewalks in front of plaintiff's 
home and yet miles from defendant's premises. 
Consider a closer case. Should defendant be given 
the duty of repairing defects on a city sidewalk in front 
of a store or other premises adjacent to his 1 If so, which 
avenue is the inevitable avenue of ingress and egress to 
defendant's premises. Is the city sidewalk that runs 
from the corner to the south the inevitable avenue, or is 
the sidewalk that runs from the corner to the west the 
inevitable avenue, or is the cross walk that runs to the 
east across Highland Drive the inevitable avenue or is the 
('l'OSS walk that runs north from the corner across 21st 
South the inevitable avenue of ingress or egress to de-
fendant's premises? ·what is an inevitable avenue of 
ingress and egress 7 Where does such an avenue run in 
relation to defendant's property. Can there be more 
than one such a venue 7 How far from defendant's prem-
ises does it extend? 
It seems apparent to defendant because of the dif-
ficulties involved in attempting to formulate a reasonable 
concept and rule on this regard that reason, equity, and 
practicability dictate against such an extension of the 
rule as advocated by plaintiff. 
C. ABSENT A DUTY TO DO SO, DEFEND-
ANT LANDOWNER ATTEMPTED TO GET 
AUTHORITY TO REP AIR THE DEFECTS IN 
THE SIDEWALK IN ORDER TO MAKE IT 
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SAFE BUT "\VAS RFJFUSl<~D SUCH AU'l'HOR-
ITY BY TIIF~ CITY. 
The law as discussed in this brief amply derno11-
strates that Granite Holding Company had no <lnty to 
protect pedestrians on a public sidewalk by repairing 
defech· thereon when the sidewalk abutted the property 
owned by defendant and when defendant did not cause 
or create the defects. 
However, in a11 attempt to improve' the corner on 
which its property is located hoth as to looks as well as 
safety, defendant contacted the proper authorities of Salt 
Lake City and requested permission to place an asphalt 
layer or coating on the sidewalk where it abutted defend-
ant's property. The city agreed to permit <lef endant to 
n•pair the sidewalk thus relieving it of its obligation to 
do so but insisted that the sidewalk he completely re-
placed. This, of course, defendant refused to do because 
of the cost involved in doing as the eity desired. 
The point here is that this def eudant Wf'nt beyond 
what the law and reasonableness required of it in even 
desiring to repair the sidewalk in the first p1acr. Plain-
tiff \\·ould now havr thr court peualize Grauite Holding 
l 'ompauy for not doing what the law did not require it 
to do and for not doing what it did not han to do in a 
man ncr that extreme ca ntion and reasoua hlr1wss would 
and could not llernand. Drf0ndant helieYes that thP in-
equity of such a situation is apparent ~without furthrr 
comment. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing facts, argument and au-
thorities cited, defendant Granite Holding Company, 
urges the court to affirm the judgment of the lower court 
in granting defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Respectfully submitted, 
KIPP AND CHARLIER 
D. GARY CHRISTIAN 
520 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Defenda1d 
and Respondent 
Gran1ife Holding Cornpany 
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